Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons
War Crimes Memoranda

War Crimes

2005

Prosecuting Plunder and Pillage Within the Framework of Internal
Armed Conflicts
Amanda J. Perkett

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/war_crimes_memos
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the International Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Perkett, Amanda J., "Prosecuting Plunder and Pillage Within the Framework of Internal Armed Conflicts"
(2005). War Crimes Memoranda. 163.
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/war_crimes_memos/163

This Memo is brought to you for free and open access by the War Crimes at Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in War Crimes Memoranda by an authorized
administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW
INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES RESEARCH LAB

MEMORANDUM FOR THE
OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA

ISSUE: PROSECUTING PLUNDER AND PILLAGE WITHIN THE
FRAMEWORK OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICTS

PREPARED BY AMANDA J. PERKETT
SPRING 2005

Table of Contents
Table of Contents ............................................................................................................... i
Index to Supplemental Documents.................................................................................. ii
I.
Introduction and Summary of Conclusions ..................................................... 1
A.
Issues ......................................................................................................... 1
B.
Summary of Conclusions......................................................................... 1
i. Pillage and Plunder Defined: the Acts of Pillage
and Plunder are Synonymous under Customary
International Law ............................................................................ 1
ii. Pillage and Plunder are prohibited by Customary
International Law: the Prosecutor has the Authority to
Prosecute These Crimes under the Statute of the ICTR .............. 3
II.
Factual Background ........................................................................................... 5
III.
The Law of Armed Conflict............................................................................... 8
A. Customary International Law ................................................................. 9
B. Treaty Law ................................................................................................ 9
IV.
War Crimes....................................................................................................... 12
A. The Codification of War Crimes during Armed Conflict................... 12
B. War Crimes within the Statutes for the ICTY and ICTR .................. 16
V.
Prosecuting Pillage and Plunder as War Crimes .......................................... 18
A. Elements Required to Prove War Crimes ............................................ 19
B. Applicability of Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols .................................. 20
C. Elements of Proof for Prosecuting Pillage and Plunder...................... 21
D. Prosecuting Pillage and Plunder Under the ICTR:
Building the Case .................................................................................... 22
i.
‘Internal’ Armed Conflict ............................................................. 23
ii. ‘Serious Violations’ of the Laws and Customs of War............... 25
iii. Individual Criminal Responsibility .............................................. 25
iv. Jurisdiction - Ratione Loci and Ratione Personae...................... 28
v.
Nexus Between the Conduct and the Conflict ............................. 30
E. Additional Defenses to War Crimes...................................................... 32
i.
Accident .......................................................................................... 32
ii. Duress.............................................................................................. 32
iii. Jurisdiction of National Courts .................................................... 33
iv. Ignorance of Law ........................................................................... 35
VI.
Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 37

i

Index to Supplemental Documents
STATUTES AND TREATIES
1. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3
Rev. 5 (1986) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 1]
2. Charter of the International Military Tribunal (8 Aug 1945) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 2]
3. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, (1 July 2002) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 3]
4. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Genocide and other Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens
Responsible for Genocide and other Such Violations Committed in the Territory
of Neighboring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994, adopted
by Security Council on 8 Nov. 1994, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) [Reproduced
in accompanying notebook at Tab 4]
5. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed
in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, U.N. Doc. S/2704 at 36,
annex (1993) and S/25704/Add.1 (1993) adopted by Security Council on 25 May
1993, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 5]
6. Rwanda Constitution (1991) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 6]
7. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 7]
CONVENTIONS, DECLARATIONS AND REPORTS
8. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Geneva Conventions (1864) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 8]
9. Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Geneva Conventions (12 Aug. 1949) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 9]
10. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV) (18
Oct. 1907) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 10]

ii

11. Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague II)
(29 July 1899) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 11]
12. General Orders No. 100 (Lieber Code) (24 April 1863) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 12]
13. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) (8
June 1977) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 13]
14. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, International Law Commission, (22
May 1960) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 14]
15. The Declaration of Arbroath, 6 April 1320 [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 15]
16. Universal Declaration on Human Rights, art. 17, G.A. Res 217A, U.N. Doc.
A/810, at 71 (1948) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 16]
17. Law of war in Military Operations other than war, Chap. 4, Appendix (b)(I)(D)
(2), DoD Law of War Program (1998) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 17]
18. Report of the Committee on Alleged German Outrages Appointed by His
Britannic Majesty’s Government (The Bryce Report) (15 Dec 1914) [Reproduced
in accompanying notebook at Tab 18]
19. Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg
Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, International Law Commission
(1950) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 19]
RESOLUTIONS
20. G.A. Res 2675, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/25/2675 (1970)
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 20]
21. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 21]
RULES
22. Elements of Crimes, International Criminal Court, ICC-ASP/1/3 (3-10 September
2002) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 22]
CASES

iii

23. Altmann v. Republic of Austria, Case No. 01-56003, U.S. Court Supreme Court,
[2004] [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23]
24. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, Trial Chamber I (2
Sept. 1998) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 24]
25. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-A, Judgment, Appeals Chamber (1
June 2001) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 25]
26. Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T, Judgment, Trial Chamber (7
June 2001) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 26]
27. Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14, Judgment, Trial Chamber (3 Mar.
2000) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 27]
28. Prosecutor v. Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment (16 Nov. 1998) (Čelebići
Trial Judgment) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 28]
29. Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović, Case No. IT-01-47-T, Decision on Motion for
Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 98 Bis of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Trial
Chamber (27 Sept. 2004) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 29]
30. Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10, Judgment, Trial Chamber (14 Dec.
1999) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 30]
31. Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, Trial Chamber
(21 May 1999) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 31]
32. Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment, Trial
Chamber (26 Feb. 2001) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 32]
33. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23, Decision on Motion for Acquittal,
Trial Chamber II (3 July 2000) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
33]
34. Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment, Trial Chamber I (27
Jan. 2000) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 34]
35. Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3, Trial Chamber (6 Dec.1999)
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 35]
36. Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgment, Trial Chamber (15
May 2003) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 36]

iv

37. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR-72, Decision on the Defence Motion
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Appeals Chamber (2 Oct. 1995)
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 37]
38. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgement, Trial Chamber (7 May
1997) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 38]
BOOKS
39. FRÉDÉRIC BASTIAT, THE LAW (1990) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 39]
40. MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES: INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW (1999) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 40]
41. JEFFREY L. DUNOFF, STEVEN R. RATNER, AND DAVID WIPPMAN, INTERNATIONAL
LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH (2002)
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 41]
42. RICHARD FALK, GABRIEL KOLKO, AND ROBERT J. LIFTON, CRIMES OF WAR: A
LEGAL, POLITICAL-DOCUMENTARY, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INQUIRY INTO THE
RESPONSIBILITY OF LEADERS, CITIZENS, AND SOLDIERS FOR CRIMINAL ACTS IN
WARS (1971) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 42]
43. LOUIS HENKIN, GERALD L. NEUMAN, DIANE F. ORENTLICHER, AND DAVID W.
LEEBRON, HUMAN Rights (1999) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
43]
44. VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR RWANDA, Vol. 1 (1998) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 44]
45. VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, Vol. 2 (1998) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook
at Tab 45]
46. KARMA NABULSI, TRADITIONS OF WAR: OCCUPATION, RESISTANCE, AND THE LAW
(1999) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 46]
47. ELIZABETH NEUFFER, THE KEY TO MY NEIGHBOR’S HOUSE: SEEKING JUSTICE IN
BOSNIA AND RWANDA (2001) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 47]
48. GERARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE (1995)
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 48]

v

49. A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD (2004) [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 49]
50. C. SCHELTEMA & W. VAN DER WOLF, THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR
RWANDA, VOL. 1: FACTS (1999), 227 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 50]
51. UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
(2004) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 51]
ARTICLES, JOURNALS, AND COMMENTARIES
52. Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, in SOURCES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2000) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 52]
53. Amnesty International Report, Civilians trapped in armed conflict: the dead can
no longer be counted, RWANDA, AFR 47/043/1997, 19 Dec. 1997 [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 53]
54. Kelly Askin, Legal Precedents in Rwanda Court, THE TRIBUNALS (2001)
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 54]
55. Greg Bradsher, Documenting Nazi Plunder of European Art, in U.S. NATIONAL
ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION (Nov. 1997) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 55]
56. Human Rights Watch Report, “Ethnic Cleansing” in the Glogovac Municipality,
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA, Vol. 11, No. 8 (D) (July 1999)
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 56]
57. Human Rights Watch, Looting Underway in Russian-Controlled Areas of
Chechnya, Press Release (24 Nov. 1999) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook
at Tab 57]
58. International Committee of the Red Cross, Customary International
Humanitarian Law: Questions & Answers (15 March 2005) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 58]
59. Bing Bing Jia, “Protected Property” and Its Protection in International
Humanitarian Law, LEIDEN JOUR OF INTL LAW, (2002) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 59]
60. Jean S. Pictet, ed., Commentary, IV Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Geneva: International Committee of the Red
Cross, 1958) [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 60]

vi

61. Anita Ramasastry, Toppling Saddam, Not His Statues: Why it is Important to Stop
the Looting of Medical Supplies, the Theft of Cultural Artifacts, and Other
Economic War Crimes, FINDLAW (22 April 2003) [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 61]
62. Steven R. Ratner, Crimes Against Peace, CRIMES OF WAR: WHAT THE PUBLIC
SHOULD KNOW (1999) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 62]
63. United Nations War Crimes Commission, Trial of Hans Szabados,Pemanent
Military Tribunal at Clermont-Ferrand, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS, Vol. IX (1949) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 63]
64. United Nations War Crimes Commission, Trial of Takashi Sakai, Chinese War
Crimes Military Tribunal of the Ministry of National Defence, LAW REPORTS OF
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, Vol. III (1948) [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 64]
65. UN Watch, Enforcing the Rule of Law: Prosecuting Genocide in Rwanda, A
Lawyers Committee Report on the ICTR and National Trials (July 1997)
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 65]
66. Richard Willing, Trial of Nazi Plunder Leads to High Court, in USA TODAY (23
Feb. 2004) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 66]
MISCELLANEOUS
67. Peter Bouckaert, Human Rights Watch, Statement at the Hearing Before the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, 106th Congress,
Second Session (1 March 2000) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
67]
68. The British Yearbook of International Law (1944) [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 68]
69. ICTR Update, Bagosora Case, ICTR/UPD/006 (11 March 1998) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 69]
70. THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1971) [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 70]

vii

I.

Introduction and Summary of Conclusions ∗
A.

Issues

This memorandum addresses the issue of whether there is a difference between
the crimes of pillage and plunder under customary international law. Since the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) prohibits acts of pillage and the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) prohibits acts of
plunder, it is important to explore whether they can be distinguished. The rationale
behind each tribunal’s choice of particular terminology begs delineation. In addition, it is
pertinent to examine which approach would be more advantageous for a Prosecutor and
how that position could be supported. This memorandum looks to the language of the
statutes for both aforementioned tribunals and the sources of international law used to
create them. It also explores relevant case law and legislative history to identify any
differences between the closely related criminal acts of pillage and plunder.
B.
i.

Summary of Conclusions
Pillage and Plunder Defined: the Acts of Pillage and Plunder are
Synonymous under Customary International Law

Pillage is prohibited by Article 33 in IV Geneva Convention of 1949 1 and by
Article 4 (2) (g) of Protocol II of 1977 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 2 The prohibition

∗

Issue 3: Under the ICTR Statute, an accused can be prosecuted for pillage. What must the Prosecutor
prove to convict an accused of this crime? The ICTY Statute permits prosecution for plunder, but not
pillage. Is there a difference under customary international law? What position would be most
advantageous to the Prosecutor? How can such a position be supported?
1

Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva Conventions
(1949), art. 33 (“Pillage is prohibited”) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 9]
2

Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) (1977), art. 4 (“2. Without prejudice to the

1

on pillage is deeply rooted in the foundations of customary international law and remains
broad in scope; it relates to individual acts of pillage without the consent of the military
authorities, as well as organized pillage as conducted in armed conflict. 3 Pillage is
defined by the United States’ Department of Defense Law of War Program as the “act of
taking property or money by violence;” which is also referred to as “plundering.” 4
Similarly, plunder is characterized by theft, banditry and looting. The act of
plunder has been more explicitly described as being committed when a property is
transferred from the person who owns it, whether by force or by fraud, to anyone who
does not own it. 5 Plunder is also part of customary international law. The International
Law Commission determined that war crimes, including plunder, are considered crimes
under international law. 6
Moreover, the terms pillage and plunder are often used to define one another, as
the terms clearly encompass the same meaning. 7 They are often used interchangeably in

generality of the foregoing, the following acts against the persons referred to in paragraph I are and shall
remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever:…(g) pillage,”) [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 13]
3

Jean S. Pictet, ed., Commentary, IV Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1958) [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 60]
4

Law of war in Military Operations other than war, DoD Law of War Program (1998), Chap. 4, Appendix
(b)(I)(D)(2) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 17]
5

FRÉDÉRIC BASTIAT, THE LAW, (1990) (‘When a portion of wealth is transferred from the person who
owns it – without his consent and without compensation, and whether by force or by fraud – to anyone who
does not own it, the I say that property is violated; that an act of plunder has been committed”)
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 39]
6

Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and in the Judgment
of the Tribunal, Principle VI (b), International Law Commission (1950) [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 19]

7

THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1971) (pillage is defined as, “to rob, plunder, or sack, as in war; to
take possession of, to carry off as booty; to rob with open violence”) [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 70]; UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT (2004),

2

international instruments, literature by journalists, legal scholars, and others describing
similar acts, as well as in case law. 8 In Delalić, the Trial Chamber made reference to the
varying terminology used to describe these like acts and concluded they are synonymous
within the context of the allegations. 9 Thus, both pillage and plunder are enshrined in
customary international law and both are sufficiently synonymous terms used to describe
similar war crimes violations.
ii.

Pillage and Plunder are prohibited by Customary International Law:
the Prosecutor has the Authority to Prosecute These Crimes under the
Statute of the ICTR

Acts of pillage and plunder are violations of customary international law. 10 The

393 (“Pillage, also known as plunder or looting, is the same thing as stealing, which is an offence in peace
or war”) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 51]
8

Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment, Trial Chamber (2001), para. 352
(“The essence of the offence is defined by the Čelebići Trial Judgment as ‘all forms of unlawful
appropriation of property in armed conflict for which individual criminal responsibility attaches under
international law, including those acts traditionally described as ‘pillage’’”) [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 32]; Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović, Case No. IT-01-47-T, Decision on Motion for
Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 98 Bis of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Trial Chamber (2004), para. 128
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 29]; Report of the Committee on Alleged German Outrages
Appointed by His Britannic Majesty’s Government (The Bryce Report) (15 Dec. 1914) This report uses the
terms pillage, plunder, loot, and sack to describe similar acts of the German forces carried out from village
to village, (“The murder of this innocent fugitive civilian was a prelude to the burning and pillage of Herve
and of other villages,” “Antiques and china were removed from the houses, before their destruction, by
officers, who guarded the plunder revolver in hand,” “…Von Hausen’s army streamed into France by
Bouvines and Rethel, firing and looting the villages and shooting the inhabitants as they passed through,”
“After this came the general sack of the town,” “…it led, as it will be shown later, to the massacres,
plunderings, and burnings at Louvain…Many houses were destroyed and their contents stolen”
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 18]

9

Prosecutor v. Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, Trial Chamber (1998), para. 584-93 (“In this
context, it must be observed that the offence of the unlawful appropriation of public and private property in
armed conflict has varyingly been termed ‘pillage,’ ‘plunder,’ and ‘spoilation”) (“While it may be noted
that the concept of pillage in the traditional sense implied an element of violence not necessarily present in
the offence of plunder, it is for the present purposes not necessary to determine whether, under current
international law, these terms are entirely synonymous”) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
28]; Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23, Decision on Motion for Acquittal, Trial Chamber II (2000)
para. 15 (“Plunder is synonymous with ‘pillage,’ which more clearly emphasizes that there must be theft
involving a more extensive group of persons or a pattern of thefts over some identifiable area”)
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 33]

10

UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, supra note 7, at 426

3

prohibition of pillage is specifically found in the Geneva Conventions, Additional
Protocol II, Statute for the ICTR, and most recently the Rome Statute for the International
Criminal Court which entered into force in July 2002. 11 Alternatively, the prohibition of
plunder is contained in Charter of the International Military Tribunal and the ICTY. 12
Although these sources of international law cite either pillage or plunder, but never both,
case law has formally determined the terms are synonymous. Furthermore, the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties directs interpretations of the language of a treaty
should give plain meaning to its terms within their context and in accordance with the
purpose of the treaty. 13
The ICTR can rely on all of these international instruments when prosecuting
crimes of pillage as a violation of the laws and customs of war. Moreover, the specific
prohibitions of both pillage and plunder include language stating “including, but not
limited to” which allows for flexibility in the statutory language; the choice of wording of
either ‘pillage’ and/or ‘plunder’ can be interpreted as representative terminology for a
class of crimes which the instrument is intended to condemn.
11

Convention Relative to the Protections of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 33, IV Geneva
Conventions (1949), supra note 1; Protocol II, supra note 2; Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Persons Responsible for Genocide and other
Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31
December 1994, adopted by Security Council on 8 Nov. 1994, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) [Reproduced
in the accompanying notebook at Tab 4]; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1 July 2002)
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 3]
12

Charter of the International Military Tribunal, art 6(b) (“WAR CRIMES: namely, violations of the laws
or customs of war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to…plunder of public or private
property”) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 2]; Statute of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, U.N. Doc. S/2704 at 36, annex
(1993) and S/25704/Add.1 (1993) adopted by Security Council on 25 May 1993, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827
(1993 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 5]

13

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, International Law Commission (22 May 1969), art. 31
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 14]

4

II.

Factual Background
The acts of pillage and plunder have long been prevalent during times of conflict.

In the early 1300’s, while Scotland was fighting for their independence, a plea was made
to the Pope which described the cruelty bestowed upon them by the English, including
acts of pillage. 14 More than a century later, in 1474, Peter von Hagenbach, Governor of
Duke Charles of Burgundy, was convicted for crimes he and his troops committed against
citizens of Breisach, Germany including pillage of property. 15 During World War I,
German soldiers plundered and burned houses as they swept from village to village
during. 16
In the beginning of the 1800’s, Napolean and his troops were also committing
widespread looting and pillaging. In 1806, he wrote to his brother encouraging him to
loot and burn dwelling of the inhabitants of lower Italy. 17 The effects these acts had on
the victims was evident, even to those not directly affected. 18 It was well known that the
act of pillage was heinous and unlawful and Napolean publicly rejected this present. 19

14

The Declaration of Arbroath (6 April 1320) (“The deeds of cruelty, massacre, violence, pillage, arson,
imprisoning prelates, burning down monasteries, robbing and killing monks and nuns, and yet other
outrages…no one could describe nor fully imagine unless he had seen them with his own eyes”)
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 15]
15

C. SCHELTEMA & W. VAN DER WOLF, THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, VOL. 1: FACTS
(1999), 227

16

The Bryce report, supra note 8

17

KARMA NABULSI, TRADITIONS OF WAR: OCCUPATION, RESISTANCE, AND THE LAW (1999), 22
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 46]

18

Id. at 24 (“a contemporary historian, looking back on the effects of pillage and looting must have had on
the populace wrote: ‘Equally typical was the looting, rape, and vandalism they suffered at the hands of the
French soldiers…To those on the receiving end, an incursion by these unpaid, unfed, undisciplined hordes
seemed to be not liberation but an ‘invasion of barbarians,’ with the sole object of pillaging and looting’”)

5

One of the most well-known incidences of looting occurred during the Holocaust
when many valuables, including everything from jewelry to rare artwork, were
confiscated from Jewish citizens. The Nazis demanded the forfeiture of property and
businesses to settle taxes created to acquire money and property from the Jewish. 20 Some
of those victims are still fighting for the recovery of their property seized by the Nazis to
this day and have filed lawsuits in the United States Supreme Court. 21 While some of the
works have been recovered, it is estimated that approximately 100,000 pieces of art are
still outstanding. 22
Similar acts of looting and banditry were witnessed during the conflicts in the
former Yugoslavia. In Glogovac, Kosovo, armed paramilitaries and police entered
residences demanding valuables from the inhabitants. 23 The ICTY has conducted trials
for the atrocities committed in the former Yugoslavia, including crimes of plunder. Under

19

Id. at 22

20

Richard Willing, Trail of Nazi Plunder Leads to High Court, in USA TODAY (23 Feb. 2004) [Reproduced
in accompanying notebook at Tab 66]
21

Altmann v. Republic of Austria, Case No. 01-56003, U.S. Court Supreme Court, [2004] 541 U.S. 677
(Maria Altman (plaintiff) filed a lawsuit against the Republic of Austria to recover some of the famous
paintings that once belonged to her uncle; the paintings are held in national art museums in Austria. The
Ninth Circuit affirmed a decision by the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California to exercise
jurisdiction over the lawsuit against Austria and the Austrian Gallery alleging wrongful appropriation of six
Gustav Klimt paintings from their rightful heirs; case proceeded to U.S. Supreme Court) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 23]

22

Greg Bradsher, Documenting Nazi Plunder of European Art, in U.S. NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS
ADMINISTRATION (1997) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 55]
23

Human Rights Watch Report, “Ethnic Cleansing in the Glogovac Municipality,” FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
YUGOSLAVIA (1999) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 56]
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the ICTY, Jelisić was found guilty of plunder for committing acts such as stealing
money, watches, jewelry and other valuables.” 24
In Rwanda, both sides of the conflict were involved with the looting. As
aggressors swept through the regions, they destroyed, burned and seized inhabitants’
belongings. The Tutsi soldiers of the Rwandese Patriotic Army destroyed and looted
civilian property as they searched households for insurgents. 25 Meanwhile, Hutu militia
from the Interahamwe opposition recruited local people to aid in the looting of victims’
houses which led to sprees of armed banditry as the militia collapsed. 26
Unfortunately, despite the efforts to prosecute war crimes under the international
tribunals, many of these violations continue to occur. Just a few years following the
atrocities in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, extensive looting plagued the conflict in
Chechnya where Russian soldiers filled their military trucks with stolen goods from
civilian homes. The soldiers seized food and valuables, stripping the homes bare—taking
everything of value—livestock, televisions, radios, mattresses, pillows, bedding, clothing,
dishes, rugs, electrical outlets, window frames, even the floorboards. 27 The looting was

24

Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10, Trial Chamber (1999), para. 49 (“The accused stole money,
watches, jewelry and other valuables from the detainees upon their arrival at Luka camp by threatening
those who did not hand over their possessions with death;” “The Trial Chamber held that these elements are
sufficient to confirm the guilt of the accused on the charge of plunder”) [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 30]
25

Amnesty International Report, “Civilians trapped in armed conflict: the dead can no longer be counted,”
RWANDA (1997) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 53]
26

GERARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE (1995), 243-44 [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 48]

27

Human Rights Watch, “Looting Underway in Russian-Controlled Areas of Chechnya,” Press Release
(1999) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 57]
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systematic and obvious, moving door to door in broad daylight, day in and day out
hauling off the goods to store in plain sight at their barracks. 28
Presently, large-scale looting is occurring in areas of Iraq. Since the invasion into
Iraq, the country has been the scene of massive destruction of private and public property.
Hospitals, oil company offices, food warehouses, schools, banks and museums have been
“looted” and “ransacked” and thieves have removed furniture from Iraqi homes.” 29
Pillage, plunder, looting, banditry – however it is referred to – is devastating for
the victims who are robbed of everything they own; it is a clear violation of international
humanitarian law and it is forbidden by customary international law as it pertains to
armed conflict.
III.

The Law of Armed Conflict
Customary law prohibits pillage and plunder. 30 There is no doubt of their long

existence in international law, tracing back to some of the earliest origins of laws of
armed conflict. These laws and customs of war stem from both customary international
law and treaty law. 31

28

Peter Bouckaert, Human Rights Watch, Statement at the Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the United States Senate, 106th Congress, Second Session (2000) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 67]
29

Anita Ramasastry, “Toppling Saddam, Not His Statues: Why it is Important to Stop the Looting of
Medical Supplies, the Theft of Cultural Artifacts, and Other Economic War Crimes,” in FINDLAW (2003)
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 61]
30

UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, supra note 7, at 426 (“Among other war crimes traditionally recognized by
the customary law of armed conflict are…(b) looting”)

31

UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, supra note 7, 4-6
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A.

Customary International Law

Customary international law is binding unless a state specifically objects to a rule
of customary law during the formation. Although customary law is traditionally created
by a “general and consistent practice of states,” 32 practices do not need to be universally
accepted to become part of customary law. Another method of creating customary
international law is through the notion of opinio juris, which requires that states enacting
new practices or rules of law are doing so under the premise of creating a new obligation
under international law. 33 It is said to be the key element shifting a state practice or
obligation under international agreements into customary international law. 34
Furthermore, a state whose practices are neutral to a rule of customary law is nevertheless
bound to it. 35
B.

Treaty Law

Many aspects of customary international law regarding the law of armed conflict
have been codified through treaties and international agreements. It is said that treaties
and international agreements have been entered into with the opinio juris element of
customary international law because these instruments serve to establish obligations for

32

HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS (1999) (Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States, § 102 (3) (1987) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 43]
33

UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, supra note 7, at 5.

34

MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW (1999), 18 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 40]
35

Michael Akehurst, “Custom as a Source of International Law,” in SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2000), 274 [Reproduce in accompanying notebook at Tab 52]
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states’ parties. 36 These instruments are viewed as an additional source of customary law
and, in turn, are binding on all states whether or not they are a party to the treaty
concerned. 37 The Hague Regulations, the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols
are all examples of customary international law created in this fashion. These instruments
embody what is considered international humanitarian law; which are also referred to as
the laws and customs of war.
International humanitarian law has developed over time to protect the individuals
impacted by armed conflict. It is said to have evolved from two sources of law: the rights
and duties of combatants during armed conflict and laws to protect the sick and wounded
military personnel, as well as non-combatants. 38 Humanitarian law places limits on the
treatment of civilians caught up in the conflict in an effort to reduce the atrocities
inflicted upon them and further places restrictions on the means by which the armed
conflicts are fought. 39 One of the earliest international instruments in international

36

HENKIN ET AL., supra note 32 (“International agreements create law for the states parties thereto and may
lead to the creation of customary international law when such agreements are intended for adherence by
states generally and are in fact widely accepted”); MICHAEL BYERS, supra note 34, at 167 (“a States’
commitment to in accordance with its treaty obligations may then constitute the necessary quantitative
element – the State practice – for customary international law”); International Committee of the Red Cross,
“Customary International Humanitarian Law: Questions & Answers” (2005) “States recognize that treaties
and customary international law are sources of international law and, as such, are binding”) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 58]
37

UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, supra note 7, at 5 (“When treaty law provisions are declaratory of customary
international law, the rules they embody are binding on all states even if they are not parties to the treaty
concerned”); MICHAEL BYERS, supra at note 34, at 125 (“The effects of treaties in encouraging the
development or change of customary rules, as well as the fact that many treaties actually codify existing
customary rules, suggest that similar treaty and customary rules often co-exist, thus providing parallel sets
of legal expectation”)
38

JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED
APPROACH (2002), 501 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 41]; UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE,
supra note 7, at 3 (“The main purpose of the law of armed conflicts is to protect combatants and noncombatants from unnecessary suffering and to safeguard the fundamental human rights of persons, who are
not, or are no longer, taking part in the conflict”)
39

Id.
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humanitarian law, the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration, was thought to be a measure taken
to strike a balance between “the necessities of war” and “the laws of humanity.” 40 This
declaration was largely focused on the prohibition of weapons that cause unnecessary
suffering to the victims. 41 Therefore, the fundamental mission of international
humanitarian law is to protect individuals from all harms caused by armed conflict that
cannot be justified by military necessity. 42
The development of international agreements has helped define the nature and
rules of international humanitarian law. One of the first committees to address conduct
during armed conflicts was the International Committee for the Relief of Military
Wounded, which established the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field during the 1864 Geneva Conventions. 43
Three decades later, the 1907 Hague Conventions adopted a number of agreements and
declarations defining the rules of conduct of war on land. 44 Historically, international
humanitarian law dealt primarily with international armed conflicts until Common Article
3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions 45 was adopted, which included internal armed
40

Id.

41

RICHARD A. FALK ET AL., CRIMES OF WAR: A LEGAL, POLITICAL-DOCUMENTARY, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
INQUIRY INTO THE RESPONSIBILITY OF LEADERS, CITIZENS, AND SOLDIERS FOR CRIMINAL ACTS IN WARS
(1971), 31 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 42]
42

DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 38, at 501; see also § V(D)(3) of this memo for further discussion of the
military necessity exception.

43

The Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the
Field has since been revised and developed several times, in 1906, 1929 and most recently by the IV
Geneva Conventions of 1949. Further, the Geneva Conventions have been supplemented by the Additional
Protocols of 1977 (I & II).

44

Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV) (1907) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 10]
45

IV Geneva Convention, supra note 1, art. 3
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conflicts; Additional Protocol II was adopted in 1977, which supplemented Common
Article 3. 46
IV.

War Crimes

A.

The Codification of War Crimes during Armed Conflict

As international agreements set out to codify customary laws of warfare, they also
defined and categorized specific prohibited acts, such as grave breaches, crimes against
humanity and war crimes. War crimes, like pillage and plunder, are regarded as violations
of the laws and customs of war with a long history in customary international law.
Limitations on conduct during armed conflict can be traced as far back as the fourth
century B.C. when a Chinese warrior, Sun Tzu, condemned attacks against cities in The
Art of War. However, it was the ancient Greeks who first recognized them as law. 47 The
Bible also placed an emphasis on humanity during war, stressing the need for mercy
toward prisoners, women and children. 48 During the Middle Ages, restrictions on conduct
in periods of armed conflict showed up in Roman law and through Europe. Codes of

46

Protocol II, supra note 2, art. 1 (“This Protocol, which develops and supplements Article 3 common to
the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 without modifying its existing conditions of application, shall
apply to all armed conflicts which are not covered by Article 1 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol I) and which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and
dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such
control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations
and to implement this Protocol”)
47

DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 38 at 507 (Sun Tzu wrote, “attacks should be directed against an enemy’s
armies, and not its cities”)

48

Id.
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chivalry reigned over much of the region, but non-Christian adversaries did not observe
them. 49
In 1862, a published memoir, A Memory of Solferino, which depicted a battle
between Franco-Italian and Austrian troops; its aftermath prompted the creation of the
International Committee of the Red Cross, an organization committed to providing
humanitarian assistance to victims of war. 50 As armed conflicts evolved to become more
destructive with increasingly sophisticated means of warfare, the establishment of a set of
rules of conduct became more necessary. Early attempts to codify the laws of war were
circulated through military law, including the well-known Lieber Code written in 1863. 51
The Lieber Code was issued by President Abraham Lincoln to the Union forces during
the Civil War and is considered an important instrument of codification of laws and
customs of war. 52 Article 38 provides protection for private property unless forfeited by
crime or seizure is necessitated by military objectives. 53
In 1864, the Geneva Conventions codified these principles in a treaty form
primarily concerned with the protection of civilians, non-combatants, and individuals
49

The codes of chivalry are described to have “governed everything from treatment of noncombatants and
prisoners of war to behavior on the battlefield and were ‘rigorously observed for fear of loss of knightly
honor,’” Id.
50

A MEMORY OF SOLFERINO was written by Swiss businessman, Henry Dunant, who arrived in the town of
Solferino shortly following the battle. He “worked with local women to provide assistance to the thousands
of wounded left unattended in the aftermath of the battle,” Id. at 510

51

Dr. Francis Lieber from Columbia University prepared the Instructions for the Government of Armies of
the United States in the Field, in which he wrote, “The principle has been more and more acknowledged
that the unarmed citizen is to be spared in person, property, and honor as much as the exigencies of war
will admit,” General Orders No. 100 (Lieber Code) (1863) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
12]
52

UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, supra note 7, at 7

53

General Orders No. 100 (Lieber Code), supra note 51, art. 38 (“Private property, unless forfeited by
crimes or by offenses of the owner, can be seized only by way of military necessity, for the support or other
benefit of the army or of the United States”); see also § V(D)(3) of this memo for further discussion on the
military necessity exception.
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deemed hors de combat (out of action). 54 By World War I, the Hague Conventions of
1899 and 1907 had created regulations of the laws of war within the international
community and violations of such regulations were considered crimes. 55 Both Hague
Conventions contained prohibitions against pillage. 56 States that were party to Hague
Convention IV of 1907 were required to inform their forces of what are now referred to
as the Hague Regulations. 57
After World War II exposed inadequacies in the existing laws, the Charter of the
International Military Tribunal and 1949 Geneva Conventions refined the definitions of
war crimes and aimed to hold offenders accountable for violating them. 58 The Charter,
created in 1945 to prosecute the major war criminals of Nuremberg, includes plunder as a
war crimes violation. 59 The Geneva Conventions of 1949 replaced the existing Geneva

54

Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the
Field, Geneva Conventions (1864) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 8]; UK MINISTRY OF
DEFENCE, supra note 7, at 8
55

Steven R. Ratner, Crimes Against Peace, CRIMES OF WAR: WHAT THE PUBLIC SHOULD KNOW (1999),
374 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 62]
56

Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague II) (29 July 1899), art. 47
(“Pillage is formally prohibited”) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 11]; Hague IV, supra
note 44, art.28 (“The pillage of a town or place, even when taken by assault, is prohibited”), art. 47
(“Pillage is formally forbidden”)
57

UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, supra note 7, at 9.

58

UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, supra note 7, at 12 (“With the second world war came new problems-not all
the actors were party to the Geneva Conventions, treatment of prisoners of war fell below acceptable
standards, massive numbers of civilian casualties, no provisions protecting civilians from deportation or
extermination, a lack of regulation for air warfare, along with additional issues stemming from the evolving
nature of modern warfare”); HENKIN ET AL., supra note 32 at 614 (“Many of these prohibitions had been
enforced long before the date of the [Hague] Convention; but since 1907 they have certainly been crimes,
punishable as offenses against the laws of war; yet the Hague Convention nowhere designates such
practices as criminal, nor is any sentence prescribed, nor any mention made of a court to try and punish
offenders”)

59

Charter of the International Military Tribunal, supra note 12, art. 6 (“The following acts, or any of them,
are crimes coming within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there shall be individual
responsibility:…(b) War crimes: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall
include, but not be limited to,…plunder of public or private property”)
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Conventions providing protection for the wounded and sick (I), the wounded, sick, and
shipwrecked at sea (II), prisoners of war (III), and civilians (IV). 60 Convention IV was
established to protect individuals; however it also provides protection to property. 61 It
affords protection to civilians during armed conflict, and specifically, Article 33 prohibits
pillage. 62 Furthermore, all four conventions extended protection to internal armed
conflicts. 63 Common Article 3 created the minimum obligations of parties to a conflict on
non-international character.64 In 1977, Additional Protocols I and II to the Geneva
Conventions 1949 were adopted. 65 Although Additional Protocol II has not been
universally ratified, it contains many customary rules and principles that are applicable to
all States. 66 Article 4(g) prohibits pillage. 67
Following in the footsteps on these agreements, the ICTY and ICTR were created
to define war crimes in the context of the armed conflicts stemming from each of their
respective regions consistent with what is now considered customary international law.

60

UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, supra note 7, at 13

61

Jean S. Pictet, ed., supra note 3 (“The purpose of this Convention is to protect human beings, but it also
contains certain provisions concerning property, designed to spare he suffering resulting from the
destruction of their real and personal property (houses, deeds, bonds, etc., furniture, clothing, provisions,
tools, etc.”)
62

IV Geneva Convention, supra note 1, art. 33

63

Id., art. 3

64

JEFFREY DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 38 at 552

65

Protocol I deals with international armed conflicts and will not be included as it is not relevant to the
issues at hand. Protocol II deals with internal armed conflict.
66

International Committee for the Red Cross, supra note 36 (“The study shows…that a significant number
of rules and procedures contained in these [the 1977 Additional Protocols] are customary, such as many
rules governing the conduct of hostilities and the treatment of persons not or no longer taking a direct part
in the hostilities. As part of customary international law, these rules and principles are applicable to all
States regardless of their adherence to relevant treaties”)
67

Protocol II, supra note 2, art. 4 (g)
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The most recent codification of the laws and customs of war is the development
of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The International Criminal Court
(ICC) was created by the United Nations in July of 1998 to prosecute serious
international crimes including (1) the crime of genocide, (2) crimes against humanity, (3)
war crimes, and (4) the crime of aggression.68 The establishment of a permanent
international court will eliminate the need, as well as the difficulties and cost, of creating
interim international tribunals for specific areas plagued with atrocities such as the ICTY
and ICTR.
A.

War Crimes within the Statutes for the ICTY and ICTR

The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
identifies plunder of public or private property as a violation of the laws or customs of
war under Article 3 (e).69 When addressing war crimes under the Statute for the ICTY,
the drafters adopted the same language used by the Charter of the International Military
Tribunal (IMT). 70 One possible reason they may have chosen to model their Statute
closely after the IMT could be explained by the relative similarities between the armed
conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and those prosecuted in the Nuremberg trials. The
atrocities rising from both the former Yugoslavia and Nuremberg situations were
68

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 11, art. 5 (“The jurisdiction of the court
shall be limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole. The court
has jurisdiction in accordance with this Statute with respect to the following crimes: (a) The crime of
genocide; (b) Crimes against humanity; (c) War crimes; (d) The crime of aggression”)
69

Statute of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, supra note 12, art. 3(e)

70

Charter of the International Military Tribunal, supra note 12, art. 6 (b) (1945) (defined war crimes as
“violations of the laws and customs of war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, illtreatment or deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied
territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of
public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by
military necessity”)
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international armed conflicts fueled by religious discrimination and resulting in
unconscionable horrors including the mass deportation of civilians to concentration
camps.
The Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was
adopted on 25 May 1993 and the first judgment was handed down by the ICTY nearly
three years later on 7 May 1997. More than just the first prosecution for the ICTY, the
Tadić case became a building block laying down important precedent for future cases,
including the elements required to prove war crimes. 71 The ICTY has also concluded the
crime of plunder includes looting by individual soldiers for private interest, as well as
organized appropriation of property intended to exploit occupied territories. 72
Article 4 of the Statute of the ICTR permits prosecution for war crimes committed
during periods of internal conflict, citing the violations of Article 3 Common to the
Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II. 73 Specifically, pillage is prohibited by
Article 4 (f) of the Statute consistently with Article 33 of the IV Geneva Conventions of
1949. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) addresses
the need for an expansion of humanitarian law to include civilians who are victims of

71

Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgement, Trial Chamber (1997) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 38]
72

Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović, supra note 8, para. 128 (“this crime ‘extends both to acts of looting
committed by individual soldiers for their private gain, and to the organized seizure of property undertaken
within the framework of a systematic economic exploitation of occupied territory”); Prosecutor v. Delalić,
supra note 9, para. 590
73

Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 11, art. 4
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internal armed conflict. 74 The fundamental guarantees under Article 4 of Protocol II
forbid acts of pillage during non-international armed conflicts. 75
V.

Prosecuting Pillage and Plunder as War Crimes
One of the first known convictions for pillage occurred in 1474 in Breisach,

Germany. Peter von Hagenbach, Governor of Duke Charles of Burgundy, was sentenced
to death by the judges of the Holy Roman Empire for atrocities he and his troops
committed against citizens of Breisach, including rape, murder and pillage of property. 76
The Nuremberg Trials did not take crimes plunder lightly. Several defendants
stood trial and were convicted of such charges. The International Military Tribunal
concluded that the looting was premeditated and systematic. 77 One defendant, Flick, was
convicted of spoliation and plunder as war crime violations consistent with the Hague
Regulations. 78 Another Nuremberg defendant, Krauch, was convicted of spoliation and
plunder for seizure of factories. The International Military Tribunal found these offences
against property were also the subject of codifications of the Hague Regulations. 79
The ICTY has also successfully prosecuted individuals for similar war crimes. In
Blaškić, facts illustrated that soldiers were seizing money and jewels from Bosnian
Muslim civilians and looting their homes. These amounted to charges of plunder under

74

Protocol II, supra note 2

75

Id., art. 4 (g)

76

C. SCHELTEMA & W. VAN DER WOLF, supra note 15 at 227

77

Bing Bing Jia, “Protected Property” and Its Protection in International Humanitarian Law, LEIDEN
JOUR OF INTL LAW (2002), 147 [Reproduced in accompany notebook at Tab 59]
78

Id. at 148

79

Id.
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Article 3 (e) of the Statute of the ICTY, which the Trial Chamber has declared “should be
understood to embrace all forms of unlawful appropriation of property in armed conflict
for which individual criminal responsibility attaches under international law, including
those acts traditionally described as pillage.” 80 The ICTY has also handed down
convictions for plunder, including individual acts of plunder on a modest scale, such as
the Jelisić case 81
A.

Elements Required to Prove War Crimes

The ICTY Appeals Chamber has held individual criminal responsibility for war
crimes valid when the offense (serious violation) is (1) committed within the context of
an armed conflict (2) of either internal or international nature (3) against civilians who
are not taking part in the hostilities and (4) there is a nexus between the violations and the
armed conflict. 82 Building upon the elements stemming from the Tadić case, the ICTR
has accepted comparable requirements to prove war crimes violations. In Kayishema and
Ruzindana, the ICTR Trial Chamber declared the following elements need to be shown in
order to establish a breach of Common Article 3 and Protocol II; the Prosecutor must
show the act (1) took place during an internal armed conflict, (2) was committed ratione
loci and ratione personae, and (3) there must be a direct connection between the act and

80

Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14, Judgment, Trial Chamber (2000) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 27]; see also Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, supra note 8
81

Prosecutor v. Jelisić, supra note 24, para. 49 Defendant was convicted of plunder for stealing money,
watches, jewelry and other valuables from detainees.
82

Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR-72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal
on Jurisdiction, Appeals Chamber (1995) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 37]
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the armed conflict. 83 The necessity of a link between the accused and the armed forces
was rejected by the Appeals Chamber in Akayesu. 84
B.

Applicability of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the
1977 Additional Protocols

In Akayesu, the Trial Chamber determined it was necessary to examine the
applicability of the international instruments to which the Statute of the ICTR relies;
therefore, it is pertinent to examine the applicability of Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions and Additional Protocol II of 1977, to which the relevant provisions of the
ICTR Statute relate. 85 The Trial Chamber of the ICTR concluded most states recognize
crimes that would be considered violations of Common Article 3 and therefore, Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions would be applicable during the period alleged in the
indictment. 86 The Trial Chamber affirmed this decision in Rutaganda, concluding that “at
the time the crimes alleged in the Indictment were perpetrated, persons were bound to

83

Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, Trial Chamber (1999)
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 31]
84

Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-A, Judgment, Appeals Chamber (2001), para. 428
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 25]
85

Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, Trial Chamber I (1998), para. 601-610
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 24]
86

Id. at para. 609 (“Additional Protocol II as a whole was not deemed by the Secretary-General to have
been universally recognized as part of customary international law. The Appeals Chamber concurred with
this view inasmuch as "[m]any provisions of this Protocol [II] can now be regarded as declaratory of
existing rules or as having crystallised in emerging rules of customary law[ ]", but not all,”) para. 610
(“Whilst the Chamber is very much of the same view as pertains to Additional Protocol II as a whole, it
should be recalled that the relevant Article in the context of the ICTR is Article 4(2) (Fundamental
Guarantees) of Additional Protocol II. All of the guarantees, as enumerated in Article 4 reaffirm and
supplement Common Article 3 and, as discussed above, Common Article 3 being customary in nature, the
Chamber is of the opinion that these guarantees did also at the time of the events alleged in the Indictment
form part of existing international customary law”)
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respect the guarantees provided for by the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their 1977
Additional Protocols, as incorporated in Article 4 of the Statute.” 87
C.

Elements of Proof for Prosecuting Pillage and Plunder

To identify the required elements to prove the crime of pillage, the ICTR can look
to the International Criminal Court for guidance since it is well established that the ICC
incorporates the rules of evidence and procedure drawn from customary international
law. The Rome Statute of the ICC has codified the rules of international humanitarian
law to be applicable to all states. It has thoroughly incorporated the principles of the
Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols to relate to international and internal
armed conflicts. Consistent with customary international law, Article 8(2) (e) (v) of the
Rome Statute of the ICC prohibits “pillaging during armed conflicts not of international
character.” 88 Although the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court clearly states
it is only applicable after its inception in July 2002, it serves as a competent source of
international law and reliable representation of legal rules deemed accepted by the
international community.
The elements of proof for the war crime of pillage have been codified by the ICC
under Article 8(2) (b) (xvi) of the Elements of Crimes official record that was adopted by
the Assembly of States Parties in September of 2002. In order to be prosecuted for pillage
the accused must have (1) appropriated certain property (2) with the intent to deprive the
owner of the property (and to appropriate it for private or personal use), and (3) the
appropriation must have been without the consent of the owner. Additionally, it must be
87

Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3, Judgment, Trial Chamber (1999) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 35]
88

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 11, art. 8(2) (e) (v)
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proven that (4) the conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an
international armed conflict and that (5) the perpetrator was aware of factual
circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict. 89 Furthermore, the
“existence of intent and knowledge can be inferred from relevant facts and
circumstances.” 90
Furthermore, the ICTR can rely on the decisions of the ICTY regarding the
elements of plunder. In Delalić, the Trial Chamber relied on the prohibitions of pillage
contained in international instruments, such as the Hague Regulations and the Geneva
Conventions in applying the principles of international customary law to the case at
hand. 91
D.

Prosecuting Pillage and Plunder under the ICTR: Building the Case

Once the elements of pillage can be established, the Prosecutor can build the rest
of the case connecting the accused with the act of pillage and the war crimes violation.
While the ICTY and the ICTR are separate institutions, they frequently look to the legal
findings in prior decisions of the Tribunals. 92
Although the ICTY has found several offenders guilty of war crimes, thus far, the
ICTR has had a much more difficult time convicting any defendant of a war crime. In the
Akayesu case, the Appeals Chamber determined that war crimes, as extracted from the
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1949 Geneva Conventions and 1977 Additional Protocol II, are part of customary law
and within the jurisdiction of the ICTR; however, they found there was insufficient
evidence to prove the nexus between the conduct of the accused and the armed conflict. 93
The Trial Chamber relied on the Tadić case of the ICTY, affirming the elements required
to prosecute war crimes under the Statute of the ICTR. 94
i.

‘Internal’ Armed Conflict

The first element is the requirement of armed conflict, whether internal or
international in character. 95 There are several differences in the statutes of the Tribunals
which can be primarily attributed to the differences in the nature of the conflicts of the
regions of each tribunal; for example, the conflict surrounding the former Yugoslavia has
been determined to be international, while the atrocities committed in Rwanda are
thought to be of an internal character. Within the ICTY, war crimes are limited to
international conflicts, whereas the ICTR holds that war crimes can be prosecuted during
internal armed conflict as well. In Akayesu, the Trial Chamber held that if the act is
committed within the framework of a conflict of non-international character, it falls under
within the regulation of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional
Protocol II. 96
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Non-international armed conflict was defined by the Appeals Chamber of the
ICTY in the Tadić case. The Chamber concluded that armed conflict exists whenever
there is prolonged armed violence between governmental authorities and organized
armed groups or between such groups within a state. 97 The Trial Chamber of the ICTR
has relied on this definition in several cases, including Musema, where the Chamber
summarized the interpretation of non-international armed conflicts as “the existence of
open hostilities between armed forces which are organized to a greater or lesser degree.
Within these limits, non-international armed conflicts are situations in which hostilities
break out between armed forces or organized armed groups within the territory of a single
state.” 98 The Chamber further clarified the nature of internal armed conflicts by
concluding “mere acts of banditry, internal disturbances and tensions, and unorganized
and short-lived insurrections are to be ruled out.” 99
In accordance with the requirements of Protocol II, the level of violence that
occurred in Rwanda from April to June 1994, constituted far more than “internal
disturbances” or “isolated and sporadic acts of violence.” 100 It is not precisely clear when
violent campaigns rise to the level of internal armed conflict; however, international
humanitarian law has been said to apply to armed conflicts when armed violence erupts
between States, between governments and organized armed forces, or between organized
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armed forces within a State. 101 It is evident the acts in Rwanda were carried out in a
planned and systematic fashion by organized forces, including the interhamawe and RPF
militias armed with guns, grenades, machetes and clubs spiked with nails. Messages of
provocation were broadcast over the radio instructing listeners to “get to work” and
exterminate the inyenzi (cockroaches). 102 Furthermore, leaders of the genocide openly
gave instructions on the manner in which the killings should be carried out; this
eliminates the possibility that this armed conflict was just an unorganized internal
disturbance. 103
ii.

‘Serious Violations’ of the Laws and Customs of War

In order to be prosecuted under the Statute of the ICTR, the offense must be
proven to constitute a “serious violation” of Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions. 104 The ICTY has characterized a ‘serious violation’ as “one that has grave
consequences for its victims and breaks a rule protecting important values. 105 This
definition was affirmed by the ICTY and ICTR. 106
iii.
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Another element required by the ICTR refers to individual criminal responsibility.
Individuals will be held liable for serious violations of Common Article 3 and Protocol II.
This determination was decided by the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY and been affirmed
by both the Trial Chamber of the ICTY and the Trial Chamber of the ICTR 107 . It was
originally deemed necessary to establish a link between the accused and the armed forces,
but that requirement was rejected by the Appeals Chamber. 108 At present, criminal
responsibility for violations within Article 4 of the Statute does not depend on any
particular classification of the alleged perpetrator. 109 Additionally, individual criminal
responsibility would apply to the prohibition of plunder during conflicts of a noninternational character. 110
Furthermore, the ICTR has held civilians can also be prosecuted for war crimes
within the jurisdiction of the Statute. In Musema the Trial Chamber stated, “The principle
of holding civilians liable for breaches of the laws of war is, moreover, favoured by a
consideration of the humanitarian object and purpose of the Geneva Conventions and the
Additional Protocols, which is to protect war victims from atrocities.” 111 Individuals are
107
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held responsible for the atrocities they commit, regardless of the capacity in which they
commit them. 112 Further, individuals can also be held responsible for war crimes they
may not have committed themselves, but were proven to have ordered or assisted. 113 In
addition, the same liability assigned to military commanders can also be directed at
civilian leaders for the acts of their subordinates. 114
Defendants trying to absolve themselves of liability will have a difficult task if
they are relying on the defense of ‘superior orders,’ which has not had much success in
the courts. This exception relieves the defendant of liability when (1) the individual was
under a legal obligation to comply with the orders of the Government or superior, (2)
they did not know the order was illegal, and (3) the order was not ‘manifestly’ illegal. 115
Therefore, even if the individual was following the orders of the Government or superior,
this defense cannot be used if the order unmistakably violated rules of international law.
While there may be some uncertainties in law that might add weight to this defense, the
unlawful nature of war crimes such as pillage have been clearly established and
pronounced in international law. 116
One of the first war crimes courts, in the Peter von Hagebach case, rejected this
defense as long ago as the early 1400’s. Hagenbach claimed he was only following
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orders, but the judges determined the brutality of his acts were his own contribution. 117
This defense was seen again in the Nuremberg trials, where it was also decided that
following superior orders did not release individuals from responsibility. 118
This defense has been rejected by modern courts as well. In the case of Hans
Szabados, the defendant was convicted for the crime of pillage despite his argument that
he was just acting on orders. The court held that superior orders do not absolve
individuals of criminal responsibility. 119
Alternatively, a defendant might attempt to avoid liability of actions conducted by
his subordinates. However, the theory of command responsibility is well developed in the
laws and customs of war. During the trial of Takashi Sakai in 1946, the accused failed to
escape liability for atrocities committed in China, particularly the charges of “inciting” or
“permitting” his subordinates to commit war crimes, including pillage. 120
iv.

Jurisdiction - Ratione Loci and Ratione Personae
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Jurisdiction is an essential element addressed by the ICTR. The prosecution must
demonstrate both geographic (ratione loci) and personal (ratione personae)
jurisdiction. 121 The Trial Chamber of the ICTR has concluded the scope of the Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II applies to the whole
region involved in the conflict. 122
In addition, the ICTR Trial Chamber recognized that both of these international
instruments relate to the protection of all persons “not taking an active part in the
hostilities.” 123 However, if civilians join the unrest and engage in the hostilities, they will
likely lose the protections afforded to non-combatant civilians. 124 Noncombatants are
considered to be individuals who take no active part in the warfare, but also persons who
had been engaged in the fighting but have surrendered or are no longer active due to
illness, injury, detention, or for any other reason are no longer taking a part in the
hostilities. 125 The armed forces sought out their first victims from lists identifying
‘priority targets’ (politicians, journalists, and civil rights activists); many were hunted
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down and removed from their homes 126 where they were clearly not taking part in any
hostilities.
Furthermore, the Prosecution must show these acts were committed during 1
January and 31 December 1994 in accordance with the ratione tempore jurisdictional
requirement. 127 The ICTR does not have jurisdiction over acts that occurred during the
conflicts from 1990 to 1993, but covers the central period of genocide and war that
followed. 128 The ICTR is authorized by the United Nations to prosecute violations of
international humanitarian law committed during this period. 129
v.

Nexus Between the Conduct and the Conflict

Relying on the decision of the ICTY Appeals Chamber, the ICTR Appeals
Chamber ruled that it is necessary to prove a nexus between the conduct of the accused
and the armed conflict. 130 The ICTR Trial Chamber held in Kayishema and Ruzindana,
based on the facts, that the Prosecutor must prove there is a connection between the
alleged violations and the armed conflict. 131 While it is necessary to establish a nexus
between the alleged violations and the armed conflict, it is not required to prove the
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crimes were committed in the exact location of an armed conflict. It is only necessary to
show the alleged crimes were ‘closely related’ to the armed conflict occurring in other
regions controlled by the parties to the conflict. 132
Conversely, some defendants might try to draw the nexus too close, arguing their
conduct was based on military necessity. The military necessity defense was historically
created to allow conduct that would weaken the opposing forces. 133 Military necessity is
limited to measures that are absolutely imperative for securing the ends of the war and
which are consistent with the laws and customs of war. 134 Property, whether public or
private, belonging to the adversaries, is protected by international law except when
seizure or destruction of the property is necessitated by military objective.135 This
exception does not include pillage for any other purpose, including private interest. 136
Furthermore, the General Assembly established some limitations on this exception,
affirming civilian populations and dwellings used only by civilians should not be the
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target of military operations. 137 This defense is a moot argument since most of its usages
have been codified. 138
B.

Additional Defenses to War Crimes

i.

Accident

Death or damage arising by accident may be an additional defense raised by a
defendant accused of war crimes because it removes the element of intent. 139 This
defense would apply to cases where the death or damage was not intended, such as a
civilian being struck by a stray bullet. 140 To defeat this defense, the Prosecution could
demonstrate the training and skill of the weaponry used. 141 Additionally, the prosecutor
might be able to illustrate intent to eradicate a class of civilians that includes the victim,
rather than trying to establish a narrow intent to kill the victim in particular. These
instances would be left for the tribunals to determine. 142
ii.

Duress

Another defense to war crimes is that of duress, under which the accused was
threatened with imminent death or serious bodily harm. 143 This defense can be broken
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down into two categories, duress by threats and duress by circumstances. Duress by
circumstances applies when a necessity to commit the act comes from something other
than threats or physical force. 144 Both defenses involving duress will be assessed by the
courts based on whether the defendant acted reasonably and whether they made sufficient
efforts to avoid the violation. 145 This defense would be difficult to assert in cases under
the ICTR since most of the pillage that occurred in Rwanda was by soldiers or civilians
recruited by the militia who looted houses for personal gain or bravado, not because it
was necessary for survival. 146
iii.

Jurisdiction of National Courts

Individuals may attempt to have their cases tried in national courts rather than by
the international tribunals. Article 8 of the Statute of the ICTR recognizes the concurrent
jurisdiction of the ICTR and Rwandan national law. 147 The ICTR has supremacy over
domestic courts at any stage of the proceeding. The ICTR has already encountered this
situation in the trial of Colonel Theoneste Bagosora, who has been considered one of the
top war criminals of the conflict in Rwanda. Bagosora was to be tried in a national court
in Belgium for the wrongs committed against Belgian nationals during the armed
conflict. The ICTR Trial Chamber I approved a request for deferral by Belgium of its
investigations and prosecutions of Bagosora to the ICTR, in accordance with Article 8 (2)
of the Statute (concurrent jurisdiction), concluding it would be more appropriate for
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Bagosora to be tried by the Tribunal, which would be precluded if he had already been
tried by a Belgian national court. 148
However, article 8 does not include cases that have already been completed.
Defendants who have been previously prosecuted under domestic law may assert that
they cannot be prosecuted by the ICTR. Article 9 of the Statute of the ICTR concerns
previous prosecutions in the national versus international courts. Article 9 (1) provides
protection for individuals who have been tried under the ICTR for serious international
humanitarian law violations from subsequently standing trial in a national court for these
violations. 149 While this provision contains restrictions similar to double jeopardy in the
United States, it is also a built-in mechanism to ensure the Tribunal has the opportunity
and authority to bring war criminals to justice. 150
Contrary to the limits of Article 9 (1), section 2 of this article expressly gives the
ICTR authority to try individuals who have previously been tried by a national court
when (1) the act was characterized as an ordinary crime or (2) the national court

148

ICTR Update: Bagosora Case, “3. …the Chamber approved the request, which it considered justified on
the grounds of non bis in idem: ‘13. Moreover, the Prosecutor rightly observes that Article 9.2 of the
Tribunal’s Statute, concerning the principle of non bis in idem, sets limits to the subsequent prosecution by
the Tribunal of persons who have been tried by a national court for acts constituting serious violations of
international humanitarian law. And, in the case of Theoneste Bagosora, as Belgian law does not contain
any provision concerning genocide or crimes against humanity, it was only for murder and serious
violations of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Additional Protocols I and II of 8 June 1977
that the Belgian authorities were able to prosecute him, given the facts that he is charged with. Therefore,
should the Prosecutor subsequently wish to prosecute Theoneste Bagosora for the same facts,
characterizing them as genocide and crimes against humanity, he would not be able to do so, if Theoneste
Bagosora had already been tried by Belgian jurisdictions.’ For this reason, the Chamber considered that
Bagosora was more appropriately tried by the Tribunal than by the Belgian courts.” (1998) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 69]
149

Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 11, art. 9 (1) (“1. No person shall
be tried before a national court for acts constituting serious violations of international humanitarian law
under the present Statute, for which he or she has already been tried by the International Tribunal for
Rwanda”)

150

U.S. CONST, amend. IV [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 7]

34

proceedings were not adequately prosecuted. 151 Therefore, defendants might not be able
to avoid prosecution under the ICTR even if they have already stood trial in a national
court.
iv.

Ignorance of Law

A defendant may also try to plead ignorance to the existence of the law. The fact
that the prohibition of pillage is also ingrained in the domestic law in Rwanda defeats any
claim by the accused that they did not know it was a crime. A defense of ‘ignorance of
the law’ is only applicable where a law is ambiguous or controversial. 152
Rwanda has in many forms recognized the right to property. Not only have they
have ratified the key international instruments including the Universal Declaration153 on
Human Rights, the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols, and the Statute for the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, they have afforded this right to their citizens
within the domestic law of the nation. Article 23 of the Rwanda Constitution, protects the
right to private property from any unlawful infringement. 154
Additionally, the Rwanda Constitution recognizes and respects the values of
human rights and fundamental freedoms contained in the Universal Declaration on
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Human Rights and the African Charter of Rights of Humans and People. 155 There is no
doubt pillaging, plunder, looting, banditry, and like crimes are prohibited by domestic
law in Rwanda.
Moreover, the government continues to recognize these crimes and has created
additional laws to deal with them. Rwanda has adopted the Organic Law on the
Organization of Prosecutions for Offences Constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes
Against Humanity Since 1 October 1990. This legislation enforced Rwanda’s ability to
penalize crimes of genocide and violations of international humanitarian law during
periods of internal armed conflict, which had been established through the 1849 Geneva
Conventions and Additional Protocol II accepted by Rwanda prior to the offences, but
had not been properly implemented. 156 Additionally, the new legislation was designed to
handle the cases of thousands of detainees so as to not absolve any one of their crimes.
The new structure consists of a confession and guilty plea program to reduce the burden
of investigators and divides the offenders into four categories, as follows:
Category 1: (a) persons whose criminal acts or whose acts of criminal
participation place them among the planners, organizers, instigators, supervisors
and leaders of the crime of genocide or of a crime against humanity;
(b) persons who acted in positions of authority at the national, prectoral,
communal, sector or cell level, or in a political party, the army, religious
organizations or in a milita and who perpetrated or fostered such crimes;
(c) notorious murderers who by virtue of the zeal or excessive malice with which
they committed atrocities, distinguished themselves in their areas of residence or
where they passed;
(d) persons who committed acts of sexual torture;
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Category 2: persons whose criminal acts or whose acts of criminal participation
place them among perpetrators, conspirators or accomplices of international
homicide or of serious assault against the person causing death;
Category 3: persons whose criminal acts or whose acts of criminal participation
make them guilty of other serious assaults against the person;
Category 4: persons who committed offences against property. 157

VI.

Conclusion
No person guilty of pillage during the internal armed conflict in Rwanda from 1

January 1994 until 31 December 1994 should go unpunished. There are several areas of
law prohibiting these acts and multiple jurisdictions presiding over them. The most
desirable avenue would be the prosecution of these crimes by the ICTR. For all intents
and purposes, it is well established that the terms ‘pillage’ and ‘plunder’ are equivalent in
definition and both are embodied in customary international law which is applicable to all
states. The Tribunals have relied on each other for precedent and persuasive authority and
should continue to do so for questions involving either of these acts.
If there is insufficient proof to establish the elements required for prosecution
under the ICTR, the offenders should be brought under the new system of Organic Law
relating to Category 4 offenders in the national courts of Rwanda. However, if the
offences do not amount to “serious violations of international humanitarian law,” they
could be tried under the domestic laws of Rwanda. The language of Article 8 (2) of the
Statute suggests the ICTR has the discretion to request deferral from national courts, but
does not mandate the ICTR to try all cases where concurrent jurisdiction exists. 158 By
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allowing the national courts to address lesser crimes of pillage, it seems more war
criminals will be brought to justice; whereas if these cases are tried under the ICTR there
is still a high probability these violations of the laws and customs of war will go
unpunished due to the challenges of establishing the rigorous elements required for the
prosecution of serious violations of international law.
In sum, the acts of pillage committed during the period of April 1994 to June
1994, were committed within the context of an internal armed conflict. These acts are
prohibited by customary international law and fall within the jurisdiction of the
international tribunals. Many cases have successfully prosecuted defendants for crimes of
pillage and plunder; and serve as important precedent for cases brought under the ICTR.
However, the pillaging that occurred in Rwanda potentially ranges from massive
and widespread looting to smaller incidences of theft. Because the ICTR is limited to
only ‘serious violations,’ or a pattern of banditry, rather than isolated acts of theft as
previously discussed, it is important to recognize that pillage is prohibited by both
international law recognized by Rwanda as well as their own domestic laws and
defendants can be prosecuted under whichever source of law will most effectively prevail
in the prosecution of the perpetrators.
In Conclusion, it has been well established that the acts falling under the ICTR
occurred during the applicable period and within the context of an internal armed
conflict. Additionally, there are sufficient findings that individuals can be help criminally
responsible for their conduct. If there is sufficient evidence to prove (1) a nexus existed
between the conduct of the accused and the armed conflict and (2) the level of the
procedure, the International Tribunal for Rwanda may formally request national courts defer to its
competence in accordance with the present Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the
International Tribunal for Rwanda”)
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conduct satisfies the ‘serious violation’ requirement or illustrates a pattern of widespread
looting, there is ample jurisprudence to prove pillage and plunder are embedded in
customary international law and are punishable by the tribunals.
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